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Howard Caygill On Resistance: ecce homo 
Although our intellect always feels itself urged towards clearness and certainty, still our 
mind often feels itself attracted by uncertainty. Instead of threading its way with the 
understanding along the narrow path of philosophical investigations and logical 
conclusions… it prefers to remain with the imagination in the realms of luck and chance. 
Instead of living yonder on poor necessity, it revels here in the wealth of possibilities. 
(Clausewitz, On War, p. 117). 
 
a focus on possibility leads directly to the centrality of the idea of freedom… In place of 
freedom, Clausewitz is interested in the Akt or actuality of war (Caygill, On Resistance, p. 
17).  
 
 
These opening quotations from Clausewitz and Caygill herald a puzzle. Clausewitz’s 
preference for possibility and with it the imagination stands in contrast to Caygill’s view that 
Clausewitz concentrated on the capacity of resistance ‘actualising itself’ (Caygill, 2013, p. 
192). How then does Caygill resolve this puzzle? Can one enjoy the creativity of uncertainty 
and chance within the strictures of actuality as ‘the sum of appearances’? (p. 18) Peter 
Hallward says that Caygill excludes the option of ‘thinking actuality and possibility together’ 
(Hallward, 2014, p. 28). Against this, I want to suggest not only does Caygill think 
possibility, actuality and necessity together, he does so in understanding the aporetic logic of 
Kant, Nietzsche and Hegel, in different ways, to be the call to singularity; in which case we 
are also exploring the singularity called as Caygill: ecce homo. 
 
On Resistance is partly its own time apprehended in thought. As the power and wealth of 
‘developed’ nations marches relentlessly forward to the grotesque, so Western political 
imagination seems petrified when faced with the idea that the poor will be with us always. 
Caygill’s book, on one reading, demonstrates the poverty of schemas of revolution and 
reform. He takes a stand against the formal, the formulaic, the revolutionary, and the 
teleological, indeed against anything that falls into the simplistic and fatally flawed dualism 
of problem and solution. Specifically, Caygill takes a stand against the tyranny of solutions 
abstracted from the conditions of possibility which mediate them. Caygill’s On Resistance is 
not therefore a handbook for direct political action against a traditionally defined opponent. 
Instead, Caygill’s little red book seeks the imaginative, the creative, and the spontaneous, in 
and as the actuality of forces of opposition. Such is open-ended resistance, or resistance 
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without a goal. In a world without tangible solutions to the inequality of resources, or to the 
logic of economic growth and its inability to hold itself accountable to the conditions it 
creates and re-creates, it is perhaps timely that we should be asked by Caygill to seek wisdom 
where solutions seem most elusive. 
 
Resistance for Caygill can be aligned to revolution or to reform, but needs to resist 
ressentiment and reaction in favour of affirmation. At times this is ‘pure resistance’ (Caygill, 
2013, p. 28) or a struggle ‘in the name of difference itself’ (p. 186). Merely reactive 
resistance is self-defeating for it sees the struggle through the eyes of the master and accepts 
his version of events and of identities. Like the door to the law in Kafka (with which Caygill 
ends On Resistance) struggle is pre-defined in such a way as to ensure failure. This is a 
powerful education for the protester who is faced by a decision to run or resist. Caygill says 
to this protester ‘don’t you realise that the game and its rules are fixed in this pre-determined 
theatre of resistance? You are behaving exactly as the police want you to do, for in doing so 
you will justify the actions they take against you. You lost by even turning up. Indeed, you 
lost because you see yourselves through the eyes of your oppressors.’ Perhaps many will 
want to resist such a seemingly defeatist description of political action.  
 
The philosophical presuppositions that ground Caygill’s philosophy of resistance appear to be 
an affirmation of Nietzschean affirmation and a negation of Hegelian negation and resolution. 
However, as we will see, there is more than one version of Hegel in Caygill’s work. For the 
most part, the Hegel of On Resistance is the Hegel of a linear philosophy of history, a tyranny 
of reason and consciousness, and a resolver of dialectical oppositions and contradictions. In 
the idea of confrontation, the duel, fought to a resolution in a decisive stand-off, is the 
absolute war of Hegelian roots. It is fuelled by the ‘lure of dialectical resolution’ Caygill, 
2013, p. 181) fought out within ‘an already established context of opposed forces’ (p. 4). This 
Hegelian dialectical model of opposition and resolution is incapable of creating new 
conditions or of imagining itself differently from its definition within the opposition. Adding 
to the difficulty, resistance must avoid being accommodated into the Hegelian language of a 
single concept, for that is to be identified again within the logic of resolution, even though, 
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for resistance to make some sense, there has to be a ‘certain consistency’ (p. 6) in its practice. 
We are seeking the ‘conditions of the possibility for the thinking of resistance while, 
nevertheless, not exhausting its capacity’ (p. 10). Caygill’s first Inaugural Lecture, (May 
1999) opened with a distancing of himself from Hegel ‘the monster of ambiguity… [who] 
lurking at the beginning of the 19th century… [and] in spite of repeated dismissals, refuses to 
go away’ (Caygill, 1999, p. 2). He supports the projects of Heidegger, Deleuze, Derrida, 
Irigaray and Levinas which are ‘dedicated to subverting the universal claims of philosophical 
reason’ (p. 2) and he offers ‘cultural history as a corrective to the universal claims of 
philosophy’ (p. 2). Against this Hegelianism of the mere repetition of opposition, resolution, 
and opposition, Caygill asks, what is it that can return as new?1 ‘Resistance’ and ‘resistant 
subjectivity’ are his latest and perhaps most challenging way of putting this question into 
practice. 
 
Aporetic Kantian Judgement 
In his first book, Art of Judgement (1989) Caygill explores how—like originality, which 
without a name stares us in the face, and like the imagination in Kant which produces 
synthesis in general, but is ‘the blind but indispensable function of the soul… of which we 
are scarcely ever conscious’ (Kant, 1968, A78/B103) — judgement-power ‘cannot itself be 
spoken’ (Caygill, 1989, p. 3). This makes the sovereignty of judgement-power aporetic, and 
finds Kant’s Critique Of Judgement ‘stating a difficulty rather than resolving it’ (p. 2). 
Caygill’s work is modelled on this approach, consistently uncovering and stating difficulties 
rather than resolving them. This is never more true than in On Resistance. For Caygill, what 
makes this aporia enjoyable is that when judgement ‘has recourse to itself for its own 
principle’ (p. 2), it evokes pleasure. This self-limiting law of the principle of judgement relies 
on ‘a proportionality which exceeds and underlies the question of sensibility and reason in the 
transcendental distinction’ (p. 298). Law in aesthetic judgements is without an end or concept 
or interest. Pleasure is not assigned to any concept by the modalities. Instead, ‘logic is 
subordinated to pleasure’ (p. 300). The art of judgement – and now the art of resistance – is in 
‘establishing proportionality’ (p. 302) between the objects which are judged, something 
achieved only in the open-endedness and pleasure of analogy, something which is always and 
only ‘the representation of a representation’ (Kant, 1968, A68/B93). The arts of judgement 
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and war are affirmative in that ‘pleasure and finality exceed the transcendental distinction of 
sensibility and understanding and point to their unity in concrete experience’ (Caygill, 1989, 
p. 302). They exceed also the Hegelian dialectic of resolution, and the duel between master 
and slave. Resistance, like aesthetic judgement, ‘legislates for itself’ (p. 305) and does so 
imaginatively and creatively, beyond any subsumption within the logic of pre-existing 
concepts.  
 
Colour of Experience 
This same aporetic approach receives another philosophical treatment in Caygill’s book on 
Walter Benjamin, The Colour Of Experience (1998). Here the difficulty of the relation 
between sensibility and reason is expressed in the difficult way that Benjamin recasts Kant’s 
‘transcendental concept of experience into a speculative one’ (Caygill, 1998, p. 1). He does 
this by putting the absolute into experience but not, for Caygill, in an Hegelian way. 
Benjamin’s notion of ‘coming philosophy’ is an ‘anti-Hegelian speculative philosophy driven 
by the nihilistic refusal of any attempt to grasp or comprehend the absolute through finite 
categories’ (p. 1). In addition, Benjamin avoids the Hegelianism of an experience of the 
absolute that is developmental and determined by a pre-existing goal or end or logic. Instead, 
says Caygill, Benjamin argues that absolute experience appears indirectly in ‘complex, 
tortuous and even violent forms’ (p. 2), but also in uncompleted projects, in fragments. One 
such fragment from which Caygill derives the terminology for Benjamin’s transcendental and 
speculative philosophy of history is ‘On Perception in Itself’.2 In On Resistance Caygill cites 
the relation in Kant between concept and intuition as the starting point for having ideas that 
can be defined without being subsumed within their definition. This is the case here with the 
colour of experience. The ‘transcendental condition of experience’ (p. 4) determines the 
consistency of what experience is, but these conditions are themselves formed and enacted 
by, and dependent upon, the specific or actual configuration of any particular experience. 
 
This is the open-endedness, the open palm, that Caygill finds in Kantian reflective judgement, 
against the closed fist of Hegelian opposition and resolution.  The ‘colour’ of experience 
exceeds concept and intuition, not as grey in grey, but as the ‘paradisiacal rainbow’ (p. 150) 
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announcing a new and unnamed law, but remaining immanent to experience. It reveals the 
absolute in a passive nihilism which attends to the ways in which the absolute is removed and 
which in turn leads to an active nihilism wherein the hope of new freedom is announced ‘in 
the distorted, comical and even terrifying patterns of modern experience’ (p. 32). This 
affirmative nihilism is a way of describing Caygill’s notion of affirmation. It tries to square 
the circle of turning a resentful infinite regression into an affirmative practice of yes-saying, 
by means of joyful and creative affirmative and resistant subjectivity exceeding 
transcendental pre-conditions which separate concept and intuition. This is the transcendental 
and speculative yes-sayer: ecce homo. 
 
Levinas and the Political 
In a personal letter Caygill describes his Levinas book as a ‘bleak read’, and sent just ‘when 
you thought the summer was looking good.’ It is in contrast to the affirmation of On 
Resistance that the bleakness of the Levinas book is truly emphasised. Caygill admits to 
finding in Levinas at times, a ‘chilling… unsentimental understanding of violence and power’ 
(Caygill, 2002, p. 1) which was ‘not what I expected from the philosopher I had been taught 
to regard as the thinker of ethical alterity and the subject of a growing body of sentimental 
commentary’ (p. 1). Levinas’s political judgement defines what is seen by many other 
commentators as his ‘irreproachable ethical rigour’ (p. 1). If On Resistance is affirmative in 
resisting a totality of war, and an infinity of escalation, then in contrast Levinas’s political 
judgement lacks any affirmation of the present, as he is ‘haunted by an unassimilable past of 
political horror and an unforeseeable future of political promise’ (p. 3). Affirmation is 
impossible between the twin powers of impossible mourning and prophecy. It is a ‘strange 
fire’ rather than affirmation that takes its place within the aporia of judgement between 
understanding and sensibility. The middle between war and peace in Levinas does not have 
recourse to itself, finds no pleasure or joy, no proportionality between war and peace. It rules 
out exactly the kind of philosophy of resistance that Caygill has unfolded in his new book. It 
offers only the ‘permanent possibility of war’ (p. 105) and meaningless self-destruction or 
‘sacrifice for the sake of sacrifice’ (p. 105). The bleak judgement is that in Levinas any 
opposition to war becomes ‘a declaration of war by peace upon war’ (p. 107).  
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On Resistance 
As early as the second introduction in On Resistance Caygill has aligned the project of 
resistance to that of the aporia of Kantian judgement. A ‘philosophy of resistance’ (Caygill, 
2013, p. 6) must resist subsumption under a ‘single concept [which is] amenable to 
legitimation and appropriation’ (p. 6) by those who are being resisted. Resistance therefore 
‘has continually to be reinvented’ (p. 6) in philosophical reflections, and ‘a good point of 
departure for such reflection’ (p. 7) is Kant’s ‘formula’ (p. 6) that ‘thoughts without content 
are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind’ (Caygill, 2013, pp. 6-7; Kant, 1968, 
A51/B75). If Kant intended by this ‘the mutual restitution of plenitude and sight’ (Caygill, 
2013, p. 7) Caygill now re-forms our understanding  of the dualism of unification and 
dispersal, finding here a ‘conceptuality that permits consistency without imposing unity’ (p. 
7). Perhaps, says Caygill, ‘it should be thought of as a variant of Kantian reflective 
judgement, but one in which the individual case does not only demand a change in the 
concept or rule of judgement, but actively resists its subsumption under such a concept or 
rule’ (p. 7): ecce homo. 
 
Caygill describes resistance not as a the unity of a concept, but as needing to express the 
ambiguity of ‘consistency without imposing unity’ (p. 7). From Clausewitz Caygill holds this 
ambiguity of resistance by conceiving it as ‘the capacity to resist’ (p. 10). Thus ‘the war of 
resistance is bivalent: it is dedicated not only to compromising the enemy’s capacity to resist, 
but also to preserving and enhancing one’s own capacity in the face of the enemy’s 
application of force’ (p. 10). This is not a self-enclosing totality of the Hegelian kind, for, like 
judgement, it is where resistance has ‘recourse to itself for its own principle’ (Caygill, 1989, 
p. 2). Its puzzle, or aporetic character is that while on the one hand ‘there is never a moment 
of pure resistance, but always a reciprocal play of resistances’ (Caygill, 2013, p. 5), on the 
other hand ‘it is crucial to avoid lapsing into a reactive posture’ (p. 67). Hence the central 
philosophical question as I see it in On Resistance is, what is it that can return as new?  
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This question is played out in terms of the drama of movement, enmity, chance and character. 
Creativity characterises those who have been able to work with fluidity rather than the 
oppositions of consciousness (Sun Tzu, Mao, Luxemburg, Gramsci, Lukacs and the Frankfurt 
School) and is present in new ways of resisting (guerrilla war, partisan war, wars of duration, 
non-violent opposition, including that of Ghandi and the Greenham Common women).  
 
Enmity and chance demand creativity for they disrupt the best laid plans. Insecurity and 
threat for Clausewitz characterised an insecure subjectivity prior to any ‘legally constituted 
and peaceful order’ (Caygill, 2012, p. 21).3 Even the transcendental unity of apperception is 
only a ‘tactical response to a condition of insecurity’ (p. 21). Yet to become brutalised by the 
violence employed by one’s enemies is both escalation and becoming an enemy to creativity. 
It enlists chance and enmity for the enemy. Unlike Kant, Fichte or Hegel, Clausewitz sees 
history more as a realm of chance and accident than as the teleology of reason. ‘In Hegel’s 
philosophy of history the accident is a stage or moment in a rational historical sequence, 
while for Clausewitz it is the interruption or the thwarting of any aspiration to such a rational 
sequence’ (Caygill, 2013, p. 18). Clausewitz is less concerned with the free will rationally 
securing its freedom than with ‘the management of violence released by the workings of 
chance and enmity. These were not effects that could be carried through to some dialectical 
resolution and brought to yield a positive result; indeed, chance and enmity stand as a sign for 
the ruin of any dialectical endeavour’ (p. 18). Fanon shows how cathartic violence can 
liberate from a colonial past but not necessarily ‘for a postcolonial future’ (p. 103).  However, 
he illustrates how the Zapatistas lack any sense of personal enmity which could brutalise their 
enemies and also themselves. 
 
Caygill states that ‘a surprising feature of resistant subjectivity is its mobilisation of the 
theory of the traditional cardinal virtues of justice, courage/fortitude and prudence in the 
understanding of resistance. Resistance is motivated above all by a desire for justice, its acts 
are performed by subjectivities possessed of extreme courage and fortitude and its practice 
guided by prudence, all three contributing to the deliberate preservation and enhancement of 
the capacity to resist’ (Caygill, 2013, p. 12). Character is the antidote to ressentiment. The 
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resistant subjectivity does ‘not enjoy freedom’ (p. 97) because there is ‘no choice but to 
resist’ (p. 97). As such ‘resistance and the pursuit of freedom do not enjoy a pre-established 
harmony’ (p. 97). On the contrary, resistance begins with the necessity of ‘a bare capacity to 
resist’ (p. 98) and emerges ‘reactively in response to a predicament of oppression’ (p. 98). 
This is a spontaneous ‘lashing out at oppression’ (p. 98) and is for all that still only reactive. 
This reactive resistance is ‘volatile and vulnerable’ (p. 98) and ‘remains shaped by the enemy 
and is initially a resistance of ressentiment’ (p. 98). It will remain self-destructive unless it 
can ‘metamorphose into an affirmative, inventive resistance that does not just react to an 
intolerable predicament but transforms itself and its condition through the work of resistance, 
the actualising of its capacity to resist’ (pp. 98-9). This actuality is the character of resistant 
subjectivity, for resisting with no goal other than to actualise resistance means ‘resistance is 
closer to the pre-modern doctrine of the virtues than to the modern value of freedom: it 
responds to an implacable demand for justice with actions characterised by fortitude or the 
ability to sustain courage over a long period of time without any certainty of outcome, along 
with prudence in the choice and deployment of limited means’ (p. 97). Such subjectivity is 
principled not in conforming to the closed fist of theoretical principles, but to the open palm 
of practical principles, i.e. virtue, which leads to ‘the formation of new capacities to resist’ (p. 
99). 
 
This all leads to the conclusion of the book where the pleasure of invention in the necessity of 
resistance overcomes the mechanical reactive lashing out, and forms new resistant 
subjectivities which have their actuality in their own character, i.e. in the character of their 
active struggle. Against the persistent (Hegelian) dualism of domination and bondage (in 
which the slave perhaps works, or perhaps resists), resistance is disillusioned if it is only 
reproductive of that same dualism. Instead, as an end without an end, one where resistance is 
action formative of its own principles/virtues, Kant’s art of the aesthetic judgement becomes 
an honourable art of resistance, ‘one with its own necessities, its own affirmations and its 
own joy’ (p. 208): ecce homo. 
 
Affirmation 
 9 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in 
JOURNAL FOR CULTURAL RESEARCH on 23 September 2014, available online: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14797585.2014.959310. 
The roots of Caygill’s notion of affirmation lie partly in Nietzsche. In an essay ‘Affirmation 
and Eternal Return In The Free-Spirit Trilogy’4 Caygill explores eternal return as ‘the 
outcome of a crisis of judgement’ (Caygill, 1991, p. 216) which is rehearsed in the free-spirit 
trilogy of Human All Too Human, Daybreak, and The Gay Science, and is recommended by 
Nietzsche in Ecce Homo. Caygill’s reading emphasises ‘the difficult, aporetic character of the 
doctrine’ (p. 217) over any systematic relation to will to power or the overman. It is more of a 
statement of the puzzle than the solution of the enigma of liberation. Heidegger’s notion of 
affirmation, says Caygill, is the ecstatic account of temporality or authentic Dasein. But, he 
asks, is there a way of understanding judgement which is not ‘exhausted by past and future 
united in the movement of willing?’ (p. 219) Here Caygill asks the key question, ‘what is it 
that can return as new?’ (p. 226)  
 
The post-Zarathustra period is Nietzsche’s no-saying, but only in order to draw in the 
gebildeten to the horror of their passive nihilism and slave morality. It is also the period in 
which Nietzsche returns to the earlier trilogy, through the new Prefaces written in 1886. 
These Prefaces do not mark a recovery of the I that was lost in the crisis of subjectivity which 
the trilogy expresses. Instead, what is recovered ‘in remembrance is new and original, even if 
it had always been present’ (p. 224). For Caygill the new is recovered from within the crisis, 
but is not determined by subsumptive judgements of yes and no, of negation and recovery, of 
denial and affirmation. This return is a form of questioning ‘which really inverts the meaning 
of the signature “Nietzsche”’ (p. 225). It is to reinvent Nietzsche by keeping open the 
question of who Nietzsche is. This is an art of affirmation, creative, open and inventive, in 
search of the man called Nietzsche rather than recovering him. These new Prefaces do not 
return to ‘deliver his own or philosophy’s funeral oration [Hegel’s grey in grey]… but to 
announce the recovery of his calling; he returns to announce his return’ (p. 225) – much in 
the way that Caygill notes how ‘calls’ to resistance ‘perform a capacity to resist which, once 
declared, is actualised’ Caygill, 2013, p. 192). The calling is testimony ‘to a capacity to resist 
in the course of actualising itself’ (p. 192).  
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Here, then, in answer to the question what is it that can return as new, Caygill says ‘the 
return of the calling is the discovery of something new and original’ (p. 226). It is a process 
of invention and discovery even if what is discovered and created had always been present. 
The new in eternal return is the colour of experience in Benjamin, and is what is missing 
from Levinas’s notion of the political. Hegelian recollection, for Caygill, is ultimately only a 
repetition of the same while the calling in Nietzsche includes recollection but also exceeds it. 
It satisfies the dualistic desire for process and result, but it is also ‘other, strange, a tyrant 
without a name’ (p. 226). Avoiding this tyrant only exacts retribution, and demands penance. 
This nameless tyrant is ‘originality’ (Nietzsche, 1974,§261) and ‘it stares us all in the face’ 
(§261). It is the burden of the question ‘which must be borne to the extent of becoming the 
greatest weight’ (Caygill, 1991, p. 226). Daybreak is ‘the return of the calling of something 
new and questionable’ (p. 226). It is to execute the tradition, using both senses of the word – 
to end and to actualise. These are the free spirits; those who are liberated in ‘judgement’s 
questioning of judgement’ (p. 230): ecce homo. This judgement of judgement is not grey in 
grey, it is ‘beyond human measure’ (p. 230); its affirmation is ‘beyond man and time’ (p. 
230).  
 
Interrupting Caygill here for a moment, I note my own suspicion of such notions of excess 
which appear to me to be a ressentiment against actuality, ‘a despairing rationalism without 
reason’ (Rose, 1996, p. 7). But Caygill’s notion of excess is both transcendental and 
speculative. For example, in a paper on Blake and Hegel he distinguishes the Hegel of 
completion from the Hegel of ‘Bacchanalian revel keeping its shape through constant 
movement’ (Caygill, 2000, p. 197). Blake’s doctrine of contraries, found in ‘energy, genius, 
infinity, excess and prodigiousness’ (p. 199), is capable of receiving ‘the infinity of spirit’ (p. 
200). Exceeding resolution here in both cases is transcendental and speculative. Yet the 
Hegel of completion and recollection is also present here. Caygill points out that unlike 
Blake’s colour of experience, Hegel’s grey on grey fails to ‘exceed … the bounds of received 
metaphysical opposition’(p. 202). What this illustrates is that Caygill finds Hegel’s work at 
times to be deterministic, and at times to be aporetic. Caygill’s own use of Hegel embraces 
this puzzle. In ‘The Promise of Justice’ Caygill finds the excess of justice both ‘familiar and 
strange’ (Caygill, 2007, p. 30). This notion of excess needs to be seen within the puzzle of the 
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transcendental and its actuality, within the aporetic philosophy of Kant, Nietzsche and Hegel. 
(I failed to do justice to this in an earlier draft of this paper, where my own criticisms 
exceeded the aporetic Caygill I was trying to support.) The relation between them becomes 
even more intriguing in the discussion of Nietzschean affirmation. In describing the 
formation of the affirmation of unnameable singularity, this return did ‘not simply invert or 
ignore the old yes and no, [it] “sublated” them’ (Caygill, 1991, p. 230). This use of aufheben 
is significant. It speaks of the generous Hegel of phenomenology, of misrecognition and 
recognition, of movement, of revel, and as we will see, of education, lurking in Caygill who, 
despite repeated dismissals, refuses to go away.5  
 
Whatever the ‘truth’ here of aufheben as a notion of excess and return, the arts of judgement 
and resistance are affirmative in doing penance for the limits of justice and subsumptive 
logic. ‘The New, the Unique, the Incomparable, cannot be named; “their” calling is not the 
affirmation of a given limit but a limitless giving which exceeds the bonds of human 
measure. With this Nietzsche both fulfils and destroys the tradition of judgement’ (p. 235): 
ecce homo. Indeed, before the yes and no there must be a yes of judgement, else how could 
there be judgement, law, or concept? The place of this originary yes is nameless yet ‘stares us 
all in the face’ (p. 235). It is affirmed precisely in calling all oppositions into question  
because this questioning ‘destroys the very opposition’ (p. 231) of yes and no. What stares us 
in the face is that judgements are aporetic and must ‘both return and be made anew’ (p. 236). 
To affirm this, to say yes and amen to the return and to the new, is to will the question of 
judgement eternally. Was that life staring me in the face? Well then, once more. The ‘extreme 
statement of eternal return – one beyond time – leads paradoxically to an affirmation of 
singularity’ (p. 236): ecce homo. When this return is made eternal ‘it is driven to its limit in 
absurdity’ (p. 236); and at the moment of parody the greatest burden ‘changes into the 
greatest joy’ (p. 236) – the same joy that is released when resistance transforms its yes or no 
into an affirmation of singular resistant subjectivity: ecce homo. 
 
This point is made again twenty years later in Caygill’s second Inaugural Lecture. 
Zarathustra’s ‘ethical recommendation to live each moment as if it would return eternally can 
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be read as a formula for the constitution of resistant subjectivity’ (Caygill, 2012, p. 24). This 
eternal return ‘is also the test of the character of such subjectivity – a test of the ability to 
accept the insecurity implied by the formula as either the greatest burden or liberation’ (p. 
24).  
 
The trilogy of ‘The Speculative Community’ 
If On Resistance pits Clausewitz against Hegel through Nietzschean affirmation, this was not 
the case in an earlier trilogy written by Caygill in 1994, entitled Hegel And The Speculative 
Community. These essays conjoin Kant on judgement, Clausewitz on war, and Hegel on 
politics. Even more interesting is that the Hegel of these essays is not the Hegel of On 
Resistance where dialectical oppositions are resolved without waste or excess.  
 
The Hegel of the 1994 trilogy is much more generous than the Hegel of On Resistance. 
Hegel’s release from the left/right distinction – originally forged by the young Hegelians of 
the 1830s – by a Kant/Nietzsche axis of interest has allowed Hegel’s philosophy to be read as 
a reflection on revolutionary events ‘without adopting a dogmatic or partisan position with 
respect to them’ (Caygill, 1994, p. 3). This allows Caygill to explore community, violence 
and constitution in Hegel in just such a generous spirit. In addition, Caygill notes that the 
Science Of Logic shows the impossibility of reconciling thought and being and is ‘a 
continuation of the phenomenology of the misrecognitions of reason and actuality’ (p. 11). 
Spirit here is the ‘recognition of the necessity of misrecognition’ (p. 12) and is practised in 
speculative philosophy and perhaps in the speculative community. It is this (albeit oblique) 
reference to the educational nature of recognition and misrecognition that underpins much of 
Caygill’s more generous Hegel. Against a reading of the rational as real or the real as rational 
he notes that Hegel, shortly before his death, is reported to have said ‘what is actual is 
rational. But not everything which exists is actual, what is bad is insubstantial and broken in 
itself’ (p. 12). This broken Hegel is not to the fore in On Resistance, neither is the Hegel in 
which truth is movement, ‘the dance that never ceases, cannot cease’ (p. 19), the revel and 
repose of the true. Yet this Hegel is central to Caygill’s notion of the speculative community. 
He derides the dialectical which in its own crisis of duality posits unity or destruction and 
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ruin, a vicious circle returned to in On Resistance. But what is not found in On Resistance is a 
view of the speculative which ‘tries to assume responsibility’ (p. 21) for the violence of the 
misrecognition and the political form it takes. Taking responsibility here, and taking 
responsibility in On Resistance for the calling to the question, are both experiments in 
affirming resistant subjectivity. 
 
In his trilogy, one of Caygill’s major criticisms of Hegel’s Philosophy Of Right is that it 
abstracts violence from political rights in a way not justified by either the Phenomenology or 
the Science Of Logic. The early Hegel clearly saw the violence of property determining the 
sphere of civility and legal rights. But by the time of the Philosophy Of Right, says Caygill, 
Hegel had ceded the monopoly of violence to the universal class of the bureaucracy, pushing 
violence to the borders occupied by military specialists. This is precisely a move in civil 
violence that does not take responsibility for itself, and refuses the calling to it of the question 
of its own violence. This is important because, for Caygill, in The System Of Ethical Life, 
Hegel ‘mobilises Kant’s aporia of judgement which emerges between concept and intuition’ 
(p. 30) not merely to employ or overcome violence but as a way of registering their 
complicity without assigning hierarchy to one or the other. To register complicity is to 
register responsibility, and to take responsibility for the Kantian aporia of judgement is to 
commit to an art of judgement, or an art of resistance, in which the recourse of judgement to 
itself – precisely the taking of responsibility – is the affirmative joy of the resistant 
subjectivity. Finding Hegel and Kant (and Nietzsche) so close here should not surprise us, for 
Caygill says ‘it is evident from The System Of Ethical Life that Hegel’s political philosophy is 
largely a radical development of Kant’s language of judgement’ (p. 35). 
 
The trilogy is also interesting for its observations on Clausewitz in anticipation of On 
Resistance. For Clausewitz, it is the separation of civility and violence which ‘opens the 
theoretical space for an abstract philosophy of war’ (p. 31). He too ‘developed a radical 
version of Kant’s aporia of judgement’ (p. 35) but whereas the Philosophy Of Right 
prioritised civility almost to the exclusion of violence, Clausewitz prioritises violence almost 
as its own ‘pure’ (p. 27) abstraction. This violence is beyond the relation of concept and 
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intuition, and is beyond the logical. Furthermore Clausewitz at times ‘equates judgement with 
the violence of imagination’ (p. 36). There is in war ‘everywhere a margin for the accidental’ 
(Clausewitz, 1982, p. 117) and therefore the imagination is needed for the commander of 
military forces to have a ‘sense of locality’ (p. 153) and, for example, to be able to hold and 
present a ‘mentally drawn map’ (p. 153) to reason. In short, ‘where the logician draws the 
line, where the premises stop which are the result of cognition – where judgement begins, 
there Art begins’ (pp. 101-2). Caygill concurs; the art of judgement, as of war, involves 
‘making decisions without the aid of logic’ (Caygill, 1994, p. 39).6 
 
Caygill ties Hegel and Clausewitz together in the observation that violence is integrated into 
civility, either by seeing state institution as violence giving itself existence (Clausewitz) or by 
seeing political rights as the legality of the violence of possession and property, whilst also 
separating civility and violence such that it is given over to a realm of specialists (Hegel). As 
such, Clausewitz’s account of a pure violence of war depends upon Hegel having separated 
war from civility in the Philosophy Of Right; and, for the early Hegel, ‘with the translation of 
private into public rights, politics becomes a means of prosecuting the clash of private 
interests at a political level’ (Caygill, 1994, p. 39). 
 
The force of learning 
The notion of affirmation that lies at the heart of On Resistance is a Nietzschean affirmation, 
a Kantian affirmation, but not, it would appear, also an Hegelian affirmation. The affirmative 
resistant subjectivity is motivated by a desire for justice, but motivated, too, to affirm itself 
beyond the ressentiment that is one of its conditions of possibility. Where the mature Hegel 
of dialectic and resolution can only reflect backwards on a failed campaign, Kant, Clausewitz 
and Nietzsche can, in different ways, affirm the yes and amen that pre-figures the resentful 
yes or no of self-hatred. But even the early Hegel of recognition and misrecognition – of  
education – seemingly plays no part in On Resistance, and he is left out of the ‘insurrectional 
community… a league of the just or a commune of friends’ (Caygill, 2013, p. 199). The 
league of the just is no longer inclusive of the speculative community even though the latter 
‘bases its ethical and political decisions on a recognition of its violence’ (Caygill, 1994, p. 
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50). Is it true to say that over the last 20 years Caygill has turned away from this more 
generous Hegel? If so, is Hegel now the hunted monster?  
 
I think the exclusion of Hegel from the insurrectional community can be countered by 
retrieving the educational Hegel that appears in the aporia of the deterministic Hegel. 
Moreover, this Hegel, despite appearances to the contrary, is in fact at the core of the project 
of On Resistance. When Caygill writes of his generous Hegel in his Trilogy it is at one point 
very clearly expressed in terms of education. For example, in the Hegel that takes 
responsibility for the ‘unacknowledged violence of the possessions of civility’ (p. 30) Caygill 
finds the Hegel who mobilises Kant’s aporia of judgement into a ‘phenomenology of 
judgement’ (p. 30), which uncovers the violence implicit in the way concept and intuition 
seem to correspond with each other. This culture of ethical life, its ‘phenomenological 
Bildung’ (p. 30), its ‘Bildung of Spirit’ (p. 30) says Caygill, is exactly how Hegel avoids ‘the 
hierarchical relationship of concept as law to intuition’ (p. 30). But in On Resistance, when 
Caygill becomes self-conscious of his relation to Hegel the monster, this education is 
somewhat suppressed. 
 
Equally in Art Of Judgement the problem of ‘establishing a principle of judgement discloses 
itself as the problem of formation and culture’ (Caygill, 1989, p. 298), and law and pleasure 
are united in ‘formative activity or “life”’ (p. 229). In both Kant and Hegel, Caygill has 
previously worked with the educational import of the aporia of judgement, and suggested that 
it is education that resists, perhaps prevents, concept becoming law to intuition. Why, then, 
does Caygill now appear to resist this educational language in addressing the concept of 
resistant subjectivity?  
 
In fact, On Resistance does have its own actuality in Caygill’s generous Hegel. In the first 
few pages, with Clausewitz, Caygill defines energy and not the free will as the capacity to 
make things happen, or to create actuality. Here Caygill turns to Hegel’s description of 
perception as Force in the Phenomenology Of Spirit. By exploring the notion of the actuality 
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of Force, he is implicitly working with the aufheben of Force, where aufheben is seen, as 
above, not as resolution, but aporetically as the return of the new within the old. Hegelian 
actuality, seen merely as sad and recollective, will not see any possibility for creative or 
affirmative resistance, because the totality of such a notion of actuality mitigates against 
anything new. But Caygill, by opening up the notion of resistance to the aufheben of Force – 
an aufheben of aporia, not resolution –retrieves the generous Hegel who can actualise the 
aporia of judgement as education, and reminds us of the aporetic Caygill for whom excess 
remains mediated by its conditions of possibility. In On Resistance Caygill makes it clear 
how the aporia of transcendental conditions and speculative configuration (logic and 
grammar in Clausewitz) does not allow possibility to exist free from their actuality, but 
equally does not allow actuality to exhaust possibility. 
 
Caygill’s critique of Sartre’s understanding of the events of October 27, 1960, in Paris, is that 
it is grounded in a fantasy of freedom of decision and choice. It fails to understand how this 
specific opposition is part of a fluid force of domination and defiance which is pre-formed 
and ever-changing. In describing the scene in terms of Hegel’s notion of Force, Caygill is 
able to draw out two significant features. First, the only equilibrium between the crowd and 
the police is that both are the fluidity and energy of Force. Force has divided itself into two 
seemingly reciprocal and opposed parts, but the reciprocity is not balanced or equal. Just as 
the life and death struggle in Hegel plays out the diremption of Force into domination and 
bondage, and just as illusory being plays out the diremption of (the Force of) logic into 
reflective subjectivity and its object, so the diremption of Force in perception plays out the 
difference between ‘one’ and ‘other’. Each fluidity involves an abstract unity needing to 
express itself in and through its being for-itself by being for-another. This whole process of 
revel and repose is the fluidity of absolute knowing in Hegel. 
 
These oppositions of one and other appear as if they are reciprocal. The crowd can solicit the 
police to reflect on its illusory universality as the neutral medium, just as the police can 
solicit the crowd to respect this universality. But, as Caygill emphasises, the dice is loaded. 
The theatre in which Force acts hides its director, its scene construction, its script writer, as if 
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the confrontation is played out on a neutral stage undetermined in anyone’s interest or in 
anyone’s favour. The illusion here, that the maintenance of order is not a particular interest 
enacted by a particular script, is the same order of illusion that sees the ‘free’ master as the 
neutral medium of the definition of freedom, and the reflective subject as the neutral medium 
of philosophical thinking. What is hidden is in plain view; it is just that it is unseen because it 
is absolutely visible. Its being taken completely for granted is its most powerful way of 
remaining unexamined. Crucially, this is not the structure of ideology critique. It is rather the 
structure of the aporia of ideology critique. It is the structure of the ‘the totality that is false’ 
(Adorno, 1991, 28), or of the aporia of the transcendental and the speculative, of Kant and 
Hegel, and of possibility and actuality.  
 
What, then, does resistance mean if it is pre-determined within the diremption of Force into 
domination and servitude, one and other, within its theatre – totality – of operations? The 
Hegel of dualism and resolution only re-enacts this totality, and looks back forlornly each 
time at its repetition of grey in grey. But the aporetic Hegel, and the aporetic Caygill, see 
actuality differently. To see the theatre, the totality, for what it is, is not merely to see how 
actuality has been put together to look neutral and not to represent vested interests. Ideology 
critique is vulgar when it assumes that, in knowing this, ideology is overcome. Force is more 
complex than this. Force is the universal neutral medium, and it is the opposition of one and 
other, and, returned to itself or called to itself in this opposition, without having overcome 
itself as opposition, it is returned – sublated – the same and different. Force is always already 
resistance to itself. It is its own capacity for resistance. And the necessity of this return, the 
necessity of possibility and actuality thought together, is learning. Learning is the process in 
which what returns to itself does so differently or as the new. In this sense, it is learning, as 
the actuality of return, that also actualises the capacity of resistance to affirm itself. Education 
here, is the formation of the resistant subjectivity, affirming itself by resisting all attempts by 
the neutral medium to prevent or to block its capacity to resist. Learning is how affirmation 
affirms itself without closing itself down – learning is never finished – and without exceeding 
or abstracting itself from attachment to its actual conditions of possibility – learning is always 
part of what it learns about. Caygill does not want to align this Force of affirmation solely 
with consciousness. So be it. But for Hegel this affirmative Force of aporetic learning, of 
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sublation – of aufheben as possibility, actuality and necessity – is subjective substance: ecce 
homo. 
 
How, then, to resist the illusions of Force if forced to do so without freedom? The answer is: 
resist actually. For Caygill, resistance is found in knowing actuality as the condition of the 
possibility of possibility. This is not excess ‘beyond’ actuality. It is rather excess beyond the 
illusion of the mere possibility of excess, an illusion formed within the universal medium and 
its appearances as and in oppositions. What ‘goes beyond’, what is new, what is learned, is 
still within the actuality of those illusions. This is the actuality of imagination, genius, energy, 
excess, infinity and creativity, which have always been the substance (or Force) (or strange 
fire) of Caygill’s thinking. This is how I now understand how Caygill, the champion of 
possibility, necessarily lives alongside Caygill, the champion of aporia of possibility, within 
actuality. The art of judgement and the colour of experience, the transcendental and the 
speculative, argue for a tarrying with ‘poor necessity’ because in the aporias of this poor 
necessity lie its own rich possibilities. 
 
Can the actual also contain the new? The logic of non-contradiction says no. The logic of 
dialectical contradiction says yes – but dialectic remains abstract if it is not its own education 
about the aporetic experience of dialectic. The actual logic of aporia says yes and no, and 
says yes and no to that. If this is to be the Nietzschean affirmation of eternal return, then it is 
that last no which is also needed if aporia (and the aporia of eternal return) is to do justice to 
itself. In Hegel, this science of logic is the science of aporetic logic, and is absolute knowing. 
I do not think Caygill is prepared to sanction the term absolute as aporia’s own truth, or its 
own logic. No matter. Resisting actuality, and the actuality of resistance, both affirm 
themselves in the aporia of possibility and necessity that relates them, in the aporia which 
expresses their truth. To return actuality to itself differently is to change the world, sometimes 
in the most minute ways, occasionally in momentous ones. 
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Caygill does not use the language of education in On Resistance. But his notions of 
possibility and actuality, in being necessarily aporetic, are of education. Education, the 
capacity to learn, is the capacity for resistance that is inherent in the character of the logic of 
aporia. This is a redefinition, a re-learning, of absolute knowing, for it is where affirmation as 
actual resistance, working for and against opposition, is to be found. As I said, I hesitate to 
presume that this is now the definition of absolute knowing for Caygill. Were I to do so, I 
would mean only that, in knowing Caygill, what stares me in the face, what solicits me, is 
Caygill the educator: ecce homo.  
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yes and no, and the illogic of refusing them, there is an alogic, just as beyond the yes or no of justice there is an 
ajustice. Nietzsche calls this a purification, a new born child, a self-forgetting and a self-spinning wheel. This 
penance for the law of yes and no is ‘what is more than human’ (Caygill, 1991, p. 231). 
6 Of direct relevance to Caygill’s work, Clausewitz also discusses whether art or science is the correct term to 
describe judgement-power employed in warfare. He says that knowing and doing should never be mistaken for 
each other. If science is the knowing and art is the doing then ‘the ‘doing’ cannot properly stand in any book and 
therefore art should never be the title of a book’(1982, 201). But, and explaining Caygill’s own title Art of 
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